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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT 
O,F THE STAT'E OF UTAH 
WESTERN CASUALTY AND )' 
SURETY COMPANY, 
Plain~ff and Respondent, •, 
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
v. 
DAN ALLISON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
12265 
Brief of Respondent 
Transamerica Insurance Company 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by 
Western Casualty and Surety Company seeking a determi-
nation of whether liability insurance was extended by it 
or Transamerica Insurance Company to Dan Allison or 
Ricky Lee Allison. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Wasatch County, Honorable 
Maurice Harding presiding, gr'anted summary judgment 
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rn favor of Western Casualty and Surety Company and 
Transamerica Insurance Company denying liability cov-
erage to Dan Allison or Ricky Lee Allison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Transamerica Insurance Company seeks 
affirmance of the judgment of the District Court of Was-
atch County. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Transamerica Insurance Company's policy was issued 
to James H. Maddox. Western Casualty and Surety Com-
pany issued its policy to Dan Allison, father of Ricky Lee 
Allison. 
On May 18, 1968, the afternoon prior to the accident, 
James H. Maddox left Heber City to go to Price, Utah, 
in an automobile owned by Dan Allison, his father-in-law. 
At the request of Dan Allison, James H. Maddox 
loaned his 1966 jeep to Ricky Lee Allison for Ricky Lee 
Allison to use going to and from his milking job. No 
permission was granted Ricky Lee Allison to use the 
jeep for any other purpose. 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 19, 1968, an acci-
dent occurred on Highway 40 some 22 miles east of Heber 
City. At the time of the accident Blaine Orvel Sweat and 
Ricky Lee Allison were using the 1966 jeep to assist Craig 
Fuhriman in putting gasoline in an automobile operated 
by Fuhriman which had run out of gas. Ricky Lee Alli· 
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son drove the jeep 22 miles east of Heber City without 
permission and in violation of specific instructions pre-
viously given him by James H. Maddox and Steven Mad-
dox, the minor son of James H. Maddox. The depositions 
of James H. Maddox, Steven Maddox and Dan Allison 
were taken and their testimony is as follows: 
JAMES H. MADDOX 
Mr. Maddox was the owner of the 1966 jeep. He 
had a conversation with Dan Allison on May 18, 1968. 
Mr. Allison said Ricky had a milking job and needed 
transportation. James Maddox agreed to allow Ricky to 
use the jeep and subsequently called Ricky on the tele-
phone. He told him that "he could use the jeep to milk 
his cows and to go back and forth to Christiansen's." 
"I told him I didn't want him driving around anyplace 
else." Ricky agreed to this, and at no time indicated that 
he would have a date that night, or that he planned on 
attending a high school dance (Deposition of James H. 
Maddox, pages 4, 5, and 6). James Maddox later saw 
Ricky Allison in front of the Allison home and again 
told him that he had permission to use the jeep for going 
back and forth to his milking job, "but that was all" 
(Id. at 7). James Maddox had told his son, Steven Mad-
dox, that Ricky Allison was to have the use of the jeep, 
but that Ricky was "just to use it to go back and forth to 
milk his cows" (Id. at 9). James Maddox did not author-
ize his son, Steven Maddox, to loan out any of his vehicles. 
"I didn't allow Steven to loan the jeep to anybody." "He 
had no permission to loan my vehicles, never" (Id. at 
] 2, 24). 
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STEVEN MADDOX 
Steven knew that his father had loaned the jeep to 
Ricky Allison to be used only for driving to and from 
Ricky's milking job. (Deposition of Steven Maddox, pages 
7 and 15) 
Steven next saw the jeep at the high school parking 
lot. He subsequently had an argument with Ricky Allison 
and told him to take the jeep home (Id. at 8, 21, 22). He 
told Ricky that "since dad was good enough to let him 
take the jeep, he should at least abide by the restrictions 
that he placed upon it." "If dad was going to let him 
take the jeep, he should have just took it back and forth 
to milk, and that I had heard he had been rodding it all 
over, and that was my gas in it he was running out." 
Ricky said, "Well, if that's the way you feel about it, get 
in it and take it home" (Id. at 8, 21-24). Steven took the 
jeep home and subsequently learned that Ricky Allison 
and Blaine Sweat had two girls up at Ricky's home with 
no way to take the girls home. Steven called Ricky at 
about 8:00 p.m. and said "Well, I'll bring the jeep back 
up so that you can take them home (Id. at 26). He then 
delivered the jeep back to Ricky, apologized for the pre-
vious argument, and told Ricky to "Take the girls home 
with it ... just don't rod it and don't run all my gas out" 
(Id. at 27). Steven subsequently went home and went to 
bed. Steven knew that he had no authority to loan the 
jeep ... I just gave it to him. I never -I don't believe 
that I could lend the jeep to anybody I wanted to just on 
the spur of the moment. It wasn't mine. I had to have 
permission every time I took it myself, let alone let any-
4 
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body else drive it. In fact, I wasn't even sure I had per-
mission to go take it that night - the first time . . ." 
(Id. at 10). 
Steven also testified that he had to have permission 
from his father every time he used the jeep and that his 
father would be angry if he knew he had used it without 
permission (Id. at 31, 32). 
In his deposition, Steven Maddox testified as follows: 
"Q. Now, under the circumstances that 
existed after you had taken the jeep away from 
Ricky, the circumstances to which I refer are the 
facts that Ricky and Blaine were at Ricky's house 
with the girls, did you believe you had authority 
to give the jeep to Ricky that night under those 
circumstances? 
"A. No, I didn't think I had the authority. 
I just left them and told them to take the girls 
home. I mean, I've done a lot of things my dad 
wouldn't have me do, knowing darn well he was 
going to be mad about it. But I didn't know 
whether he was going to be mad about it or not in 
truth. I just left it. 
"Q. You don't know whether he would ob-
ject or not to that one, is that what you said? 
"A. Yes. I never asked him. I don't know 
whether he would have objected or not." (Id. at 
12). 
DAN ALLISON 
Dan Allison is the father of Ricky Lee Allison. He 
testified that he had a conversation with James Maddox 
regarding to loaning of the jeep, and that James would 
see that Ricky got transportation to drive back and forth 
5 
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to his milking job. The only arrangements made with 
James Maddox were to get transportation so that Ricky 
could go back and forth to work (Deposition of Dan Alli-
son, pp. 5-8). He was not aware of his son, Ricky, ever 
using any of James Maddox's vehicles prior to this occa-
sion (Id. at 26). 
Other evidence indicates that between 12:00 mid-
night and 1:00 a.m., May 19, Ricky Lee Allison and 
Blaine Sweat, with two girls, met the Fuhriman and Lunt 
boys at a service station in Heber City. They took the 
girls home and then returned to assist the Fuhriman and 
Lunt boys with their automobile. The four of them drove 
approximately 22 miles east of Heber City, at which time 
the accident occurred. Ricky Lee Allison did not request 
permisison to drive the jeep out of Heber City. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS RICKY LEE ALLISON DEVIATED BEYOND THE 
SCOPE OF THE PERMISSION GRANTED HIM IN 
USING THE JEEP, HE AND DAN ALLISON ARE 
NONINSUREDS OF TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
The basic issue is: Was Ricky Lee Allison using the 
jeep within the scope of permission granted him by James 
H. Maddox at the time of the accident? If he was using 
the jeep within the scope of the permission granted, he 
would be an omnibus insured. If he was using the jeep 
beyond the scope of the permission granted, neither he 
6 
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nor Dan Allison are extended any msurance coverage 
under Transamerica's liability policy. Transamerica's pol-
icy provides: 
"Persons Insured: The following are in-
sureds under Part I: 
(a) with respect to the owned automobile. 
* * * 
(2) any other person using such automobile 
with the permission of the named insured, pro-
vided his actual operation or (if he is not operat-
ing) his other actual use thereof is within the 
scope of such permission . . . " 
(Defendant's Exhibit I) 
Unless the operation of the jeep by Ricky Lee Allison 
1s within the scope of any permission granted him by 
James H. Maddox, there is no coverage. Whether the 
negligence of Ricky Lee Allison is imputed to his father 
is immaterial. Dan Allison can stand in no better position 
than the actual operator of the jeep. If Ricky Lee Allison 
was using the jeep at the time of the accident beyond the 
scope of the permission granted him by James H. Maddox, 
neither he nor his father are insureds under the policy 
of insurance issued by Transamerica Insurance Company. 
Transamerica Insurance Company submits that the 
order of the lower court was correct because the evidence 
in this case shows that in using the jeep at the time and 
place of the accident Ricky Lee Allison was engaged in a 
material deviation beyond the scope of any implied or ex-
press permisison granted him. 
7 
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In this case a major deviation occurred. Ricky Lee Alli-
son was given permission to use the jeep only for driving 
the two or three miles to and from a milking job. Instead, 
he took the jeep to a dance, took some girls out, and then, 
in the middle of night at about approximately 1: 30 a.m., 
he took the jeep from Heber City to the place of the acci-
dent, 22 miles away. Ricky Allison's deviation was major 
and clearly beyond the scope of the permission granted 
him in the use of the jeep. 
Where the use of the vehicle is in direct violation of 
specific express instructions, there is no implied consent 
to use a vehicle on major deviation. 
In Johnson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 34 F. Supp. 
870 (W. D. Wis. 1940), an automobile salesman, in viola-
tion of his employer's express instructions and company 
rules, retained the employer's automobile after working 
hours and was taking his date to dinner to a place five 
miles outside of the city limits when he was involved in 
an accident. The court held that Wirth, the driver of the 
vehicle, was not an omnibus insured as it was clear and 
undisputed that he was using the vehicle for his own 
purposes and beyond the scope of the permission granted 
by the employer. 
In Wilson v. Farnsworth, 4 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 
1941), where an employee took the employer's truck to 
perform a personal errand without requesting permission 
and in direct violation of express rules and instructions, 
and was involved in an accident while so using the truck, 
8 
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it was held the employee was not an omnibus insured as 
his use was without permission, express or implied. 
Hamm v. Camerota, 48 Wash. 2d 34, 290 P.2d. 713, 
717 (1955), states the rule in cases of this nature as fol-
lows: 
"In order for a person to come within the cov-
erage of the omnibus clause in a standard policy 
of liability insurance, it must be established that 
his use of the car was with the permission, ex-
pressed or implied, of the person designated in the 
policy as the named insured." 
No Utah case in point his been discovered. There 
are, however, many cases dealing with this type of situa-
tion. Illustrative of these cases is Truex v. Pennsylvania 
Manuf actttrers Association Casualty Insurance Company, 
116 Pa. Super. 551, 176 A. 756 (1935). In that case, the 
automobile owner gave permission to a guest to drive 
another guest to his home four blocks away. Instead, the 
guests took a pleasure drive in the opposite direction and 
were involved in an accident several miles away from 
home. It was held that such a drive was a radical depar-
ture from the use for which the automobile was granted, 
and the owner's liability insurer therefore was not liable. 
The court said: 
"Permission to drive to a designated place 
four blocks away did not give authority to drive 
some miles distant in the opposite direction. This 
was not a slight deviation, it was a radical depart-
ure - an entirely new and different use than was 
averred to have been granted." 
9 
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In Howe v. Farmers Automobile Inter-Insurance Ex-
change, 32 Wash. 2d 511, 202 P.2d 464 (1949), the driver 
had received permission from the owner to repair the 
automobile and return it to the owner's home. At the 
time of the accident, he was on business of his own and 
driving strictly for his own pleasure. The court held 
that at the time of the accident he did not have express or 
implied permission to use the car for his own personal 
pleasure or business, and the owner's insurance policy 
would not extend coverage to him. 
In Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. 
Sanders, 169 Okla. 378, 36 P.2d 271 (1934), it was held 
that an owner allowing one to drive an automobile on a 
certain mission did not imply permission to allow another 
person to drive said car the next day in a different town, 
and no insurance coverage was extended. The court cited 
from the case of Cypert v. Roberts, 169 Wash. 33, 13 
P.2d 55, 56 (1932): 
"The issue is whether Miss Roberts had the 
permission of Nalley's Inc., to use the car as and 
when the collision occurred. That she did not have 
such permission, express or implied, to use the car 
at the place, at the time, and under the circum· 
stances, or for purposes existing at the time of the 
collision, was clearly established and must be so 
held and declared as a matter of law." 
The "additional assured" portion of the insurance con· 
tract was held not operative. Also see Grange Insurance 
Association v. Eschback, 1 Wash. App. 230, 460 P.2d 690 
( 1969). 
10 
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7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, §4367 
(1962), states the majority rule to be that the vehicle must 
be used for a purpose reasonably within the scope of the 
permission granted, within the time limits imposed or 
contemplated by the parties, and operated within the geo-
graphical limits so contemplated, or the use is not covered. 
In this case, it is clear that Ricky Lee Allison operated 
the jeep beyond the geographical limits of his permitted 
use. It cannot be implied that his use was within the time 
limits contemplated going to and from his milking job. 
His use was also for a purpose entirely beyond the scope 
of the permission granted him. 
When considering the time the vehicle was being 
used, the geographical place where it was being used and 
the purpose for which it was being used, it is apparent 
that Ricky Lee Allison in using the jeep at the time of 
the accident was engaged in a radical departure from the 
scope of permission granted him to use the jeep. At the 
time of the collision he was using the jeep in an area 
where he had no permission to use it (22 miles east of 
Heber City), for an unauthorized and uncontemplated 
purpose (helping the Fuhriman and Lunt boys), and at 
an unusually late hour (2:00 a.m.). 
By driving the jeep for a purpose and at a time and 
place not contemplated by the owner thereof, Ricky Lee 
Allison removed himself from the provisions of the policy 
providing coverage to one using the automobile with per-
mission. 
The appellant's brief refers to an emergency situa-
tion and implies that permission would have been granted 
11 
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to Ricky Lee Allison to drive 25 miles east of Heber City 
to assist the Fuhriman and Lunt boys. The appellant 
poses the question as to whether a permissive user must 
leave the bleeding victims of an automobile accident along 
the side of the road in order to preserve the protection 
of the insurance policy. Obviously, if there was a danger 
to human life an emergency situation would be present 
in which the deviation from the agreed-to course of the 
automobile would be acceptable within reasonable limita-
tions. However, in this case there is nothing to establish 
an emergency situation on the part of Fuhriman and Lunt. 
These boys were not in an emergency. They were stand-
ing in a service station in Heber City where aid was avail-
able and where they were safe. 
In Bower v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 13 Wis. 
2d 21, 108 N.W.2d 271 (1961), a mother gave her daugh-
ter permission to use the automobile to pick up some 
class pictures. While her daughter was in the studio the 
police informed her passenger that the car should be 
moved as it was in a no parking area. While moving the 
car, the passenger had an accident. The court held that 
no emergency existed which would create implied consent 
by the owner of the car to allow the passenger to oper-
ate the automobile. Accordingly, the passenger was not 
covered as an omnibus insured under the mother's liabil-
ity insurance policy. It would seem that a directive of 
this nature from a police officer would constitute more 
of an emergency situation than the gratuitous attempt on 
the part of Ricky Lee Allison to help Fuhriman and Lunt 
get their automobile filled with gas. 
12 
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POINT II 
STEVEN MADDOX HAD NO AUTHORI1Y TO 
GIVE RICK ALLISON PERMISSION TO USE THE 
JEEP. 
The appellant's brief in its Conclusion claims that 
the vehicle was returned to Ricky Allison by Steve Mad-
dox without restriction except the instruction not to "rod 
it." The depositions indicate that it was made perfectly 
clear to Ricky Allison that he was not only not to "rod it" 
but was not to use it for any purpose other than taking 
the girls home. 
Further, appellant's argument misses the point . Be-
cause a certain restriction is not placed upon the use it 
does not logically follow that all uses, save uses specifically 
excepted, are permitted. Appellant cannot find authorized 
use in every area where no specific restriction was im-
posed. The scope of permission granted establishes the 
authorized use - not the possible uses remaining after all 
restrictions are applied. 
Regardless of the actual terms of the redelivery of 
the vehicle to Ricky to Steve Maddox, Steve Maddox had 
no authority to deliver the vehicle to Rick Allison on any 
terms different from those orginally entered into by James 
Maddox and Rick Allison. The record clearly indicates 
that Steve knew that he had no authority to lend out his 
father's vehicles. A fortiori, since he testified that he 
was not even to use his father's vehicles himself without 
his father's permission, he could not have had authority 
to expand the rules of permitted use set down by his 
father. 
13 
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In Norris v. Pacific Indemnit:y Co., 39 Cal.2d 420, 
247 P.2d 1 (1952), it appeared that the owner of the 
vehicle had given his son permission to use a car but pro-
hibited him from loaning it to any other person. While 
at a fried's home, the son loaned the car to another party, 
who subsequently was involved in an accident. The court 
held that there was no permission for the third party to 
use the car and that no insurance applied. The court 
sta::ed the rule that "where the facts as here showed 
neither express nor implied permission for the permittee's 
delegation of the use of the car to another, the third per-
son has been held not to be the responsible person with 
permission and therefore not protected by the omnibus 
clause." 247 P.2d at 4. 
In Civil Service Employees Insurance Co. v. Roberts, 
10 Ariz. App. 512, 460 P.2d 48 (1969), the owner of a 
jeep occasionally allowed his son to drive it. He was 
required to seek his father's permission for each use of the 
jeep, and there was a general understanding between 
them that the jeep was not to be loaned out or driven 
by others. While using the jeep with permission, he 
allowed his girl friend to drive it and an accident ensued. 
The court held that the son was not a named insured or 
an owner within the meaning of the policy, had no author-
ity to give permission to another to drive the jeep, and 
thus no insurance applied to the girl who was driving. 
The court s'lid, "In our view the particular risk result-
ing in this accident was not one within the contemplation 
of the parties to this contract and is fairly within this 
exclusionary clause." 460 P.2d at 51. 
14 
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A similar case was reported in Helmkamp v. Amer-
ican Family Mutual Insurance Co., 407 S.W.2d 559, (Mo. 
App. 1966), where the minor son of the owner of the 
insured automobile was permitted to drive to a church 
social gathering. The minor had his father's permission 
to take a girl friend home in the car, but acceded to her 
request that she be allowed to drive around the block. 
The court held that the person seeking to be insured did 
not meet her burden of showing that the owner "either 
through his words, conduct, or the nature and scope of 
the permisson granted by him to Robert (the minor son), 
indicated Robert, in turn, would be clothed with authority 
to pass on (his father's) permission to (the driver)". 
Similar results were reached in the cases of ]ones v. 
Indiana Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance Co., 161 So.2d 
445, (La. App. 1964); Indemnity Insurance Co. of North 
America v. Sanders, 169 Okla. 378, 36 P.2d 271 (1934); 
Grange Insurance Association v. Eschback, 1 Wash. App. 
230, 460 P.2d 690 ( 1969); and Hamm v. Camerota, 48 
Wash. 2d 34, 290 P.2d 713 (1955). 
It should also be noted that the terms of Transamer-
ica's policy require that the use of a non-owned automo-
bile be "within the permission or reasonably believed to 
be with the permission, of the owner and is within the 
scope of such permission." Defendant's Exhibit 1 at 6. 
It is undisputed that Steven Maddox was not the owner 
of the automobile, and the testimony contained in the 
depositions clearly establishes that he had no authority 
to lend the automobile to Ricky Lee Allison. 
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The appellant's brief sets forth the general proposi-
tion that any ambiguity in the insurance policies must be 
construed in favor of the insured. There is nothing ambig-
uous about the permissive user clause of Transamerica's 
insurance policy. It simply requires permission from the 
owner of the vehicle. The depositions on file herein 
clearly indicate that no permission was given by the 
owner of the jeep, nor by his son (who had no authority 
m any event). It should be apparent that no ambiguity 
exists. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed 
because: 
1. Ricky Lee Allison was using the jeep beyond the 
scope of the express permission granted him by James H. 
Maddox. 
2. The boys did not have implied permission be-
cause they were using the jeep on a major deviation at 
the time of the accident. 
Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of 
Transamerica Insurance Company should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Raymond M. Berry 
Allan L. Larson 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Seventh Floor Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Transamerica Insurance Company 
16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING NOTICE 
I hereby certify I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
brief, postage prepaid, to John L. Chidester, 51 West 
Center Street, Heber City, Utah, and two copies to Glenn 
" C. Hanni, Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah this _______ _ 
day of ----------------------------------------• 1971. 
17 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
